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In Deliberation and Strategy on the United States Courts of Appeals:  An 
Empirical Exploration of Panel Effects,1 I explored panel effects, the well-
documented phenomenon that judges hearing cases together appear 
to be influenced by the preferences of the colleagues with whom they 
sit.2  My study sought to advance our understanding of panel effects by 
examining when they occur in an effort to better understand why they 
occur.  More specifically, I constructed an empirical test intended to 
distinguish between two competing theories—an “internal delibera-
tive” explanation and a strategic explanation.3
 
† Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Development and Professor of Law, 
Washington University School of Law, St. Louis. 
  The first posits that 
panel effects result entirely from the processes of discussion, delibera-
tion, and persuasion that occur among the three judges on a circuit 
panel and that these effects are not influenced by any other actors in 
1
Pauline T. Kim, Deliberation and Strategy on the United States Courts of Appeals:  An 
Empirical Exploration of Panel Effects, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1319 (2009). 
2
See id. at 1322-24 and sources cited therein (reviewing recent empirical studies of 
panel effects). 
3
Id. at 1333-38. 
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the judicial system.4  By contrast, the second explanation hypothesizes 
that appellate judges are strategic actors who anticipate the response 
of the circuit en banc or the Supreme Court.5  Thus, their willingness 
to go along with the views of their colleagues (i.e., panel effects) will 
depend upon how the preferences of the reviewing court are aligned 
with the views of the panel members.  What I found is that circums-
tances external to the panel appear to matter, at least some of the 
time.6  When deciding the sex discrimination in employment cases 
that I studied, federal appellate judges appeared to be more or less 
open to influence by their panel colleagues depending upon how the 
preferences of the panel members aligned with the preferences of the 
circuit as a whole.7  On the other hand, their willingness to avoid dis-
sents and go along with their panel colleagues seemed unaffected by 
their relative alignment with the preferences of the Supreme Court.8
These results are important for a couple of reasons.  First, they of-
fer evidence that observed panel effects are not likely the result of in-
teractions wholly internal to the three judges on an appellate panel.  
The circuit environment also matters and mediates the panel effects 
we observe.  Second, the results fail to support the theory that panel 
effects are driven by the panelists’ strategic interactions vis-à-vis the 
Supreme Court.  This finding undermines one of the theories offered 
to explain how the Supreme Court can effectively exercise control 
over the lower federal courts when it reviews fewer than one percent 
of their decisions annually.  Specifically, it undermines the theory that 
the risk of dissent by a minority panel member induces circuit judges to 
comply with precedent out of fear of reversal by the Supreme Court.
 
9
Two responses published in this journal
 
10
 
4
Id. at 1333. 
—one by Stefanie A. 
Lindquist and Wendy L. Martinek, the other by Derek J. Linkous and 
Emerson H. Tiller—thoughtfully comment on how my study relates to 
5
Id. at 1334.  
6
Id. at 1358-67. 
7
Id. at 1361-67. 
8
Id. at 1358-61. 
9
See, e.g., Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to 
Legal Doctrine:  Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2159 
(1998). 
10
Stefanie A. Lindquist & Wendy L. Martinek, Response, Psychology, Strategy, and 
Behavioral Equivalence, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 75 (2009), http:// 
www.pennumbra.com/responses/11-2009/LindquistMartinek.pdf; Derek J. Linkous & 
Emerson H. Tiller, Response, Panel Effects, Whistleblowing Theory, and the Role of Legal 
Doctrine, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 83 (2009), http://www.pennumbra.com/ 
responses/11-2009/LinkousTiller.pdf. 
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the prior literature and explore the implications of my empirical find-
ings for understanding decisionmaking by collegial courts.  Their res-
ponses help to sharpen understanding of what my study contributes, 
as well as its limitations.  I believe that some of their comments reflect 
a misunderstanding of the purpose of my study, however, and I seek 
here to clarify what might have been misunderstood and where our 
real differences lie. 
Perhaps the most important clarification is that my Article is not 
about whistleblower theory (WT)—at least, not principally—although 
it does discuss Frank B. Cross and Emerson H. Tiller’s influential ar-
ticle, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine:  Whistleblowing 
on the Federal Courts of Appeals, which appeared in the Yale Law Journal 
in 1998.11  In that article, Cross and Tiller hypothesized that judges on 
ideologically divided panels are more likely to follow doctrine because 
of the possibility of whistleblowing—that is, a minority judge “through 
a dissent, [exposing] disobedient decisionmaking by the majority.”12  
They tested their theory by examining opinions by the D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals that applied the Chevron doctrine13 in reviewing 
agency decisions and concluded that the evidence supported their 
whistleblower theory because ideologically divided panels were more like-
ly to defer to agency decisions with which they (presumably) disagreed.14
Because the purpose of my Article was to explore panel effects—
an important phenomenon that Cross and Tiller were among the first 
to document—I tried to be precise about the ways in which my study 
differed from theirs and to suggest what implications my results might 
have for their theory.  Linkous and Tiller, in their response to my Ar-
ticle, vigorously defend Cross and Tiller’s whistleblower theory, ar-
guing that I “needlessly and erroneously ‘reject’” it.
 
15
 
11
Cross & Tiller, supra note 
  In doing so, 
they have misunderstood not only the focus of my empirical study but 
also the extent of my claims about their whistleblower theory.  I be-
lieve that Cross and Tiller’s 1998 article was an important, indeed se-
minal, contribution to the literature, and that we still have much to 
learn from it.  At the same time, I also believe that their original 
theory is in need of some revision and updating. 
9. 
12
Id. at 2159. 
13
See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 
(1984) (requiring a reviewing court to defer to an agency interpretation of a statute 
unless the interpretation is contrary to the statute or is unreasonable). 
14
Cross & Tiller, supra note 9, at 2172. 
15
Linkous & Tiller, supra note 10, at 84 (alteration omitted). 
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Some misunderstanding likely arose from my statement that “I re-
ject the whistleblowing story,” which concluded a paragraph explain-
ing why I avoided adopting their terminology.16  I framed my empiri-
cal study by asking whether strategic theories of appellate court 
decisionmaking explain why we observe panel effects.  I specifically 
avoided Cross and Tiller’s terminology because “whistleblowing” is 
commonly understood to involve the exposure of covert wrongdoing, 
and I believe that the suggestion that judges are engaged in wrong-
doing when deciding cases is both contestable and unnecessary.  As I 
have argued elsewhere, the open-ended nature of law means that even 
principled judges sincerely trying to apply precedent may not only dif-
fer about the outcome of a particular case, but may also produce sys-
tematically different outcomes over a run of cases without any one of 
them necessarily defying doctrine.17  Thus, the observation that the 
voting patterns of judges vary systematically with political affiliation 
does not necessarily mean that any of those judges are disregarding the 
law.  Some judges might in fact do so, but whether or when and how of-
ten cannot be established merely by observing a difference in voting 
patterns because judging legitimately involves the exercise of discretion.  
The use of the term “whistleblowing” implies a normative judgment 
that is inappropriate given the discretionary nature of judging.18
 
16
Kim, supra note 
 
1, at 1343. 
17
E.g., Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 408-17 (2007). 
18
Linkous and Tiller protest that whistleblowing theory is at its core “[a] [t]heory 
of [c]ompliance with [d]octrine,” but that I “singularly stress[]” disobedience in my 
critique.  Linkous & Tiller, supra note 10, at 85 (first four alterations in original) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cross & Tiller, supra note 9, at 2158).  That 
stress, however, merely reflects the emphasis in Cross and Tiller’s original article, in 
which they described judges as pursuing “partisan ambitions,” Cross & Tiller, supra 
note 9, at 2175, and engaging in “manipulation or disregard of the applicable legal 
doctrine,” id. at 2156, “cheating,” id. at 2175, “subversions of legal precedent and doc-
trine,” id. at 2156, and “disobedient decisionmaking,” id. at 2159.  In a subsequent 
work, they describe their theory in the following terms:  “the minority member can 
blow the whistle on the majority’s unprincipled manipulation of doctrine.”  Emerson 
H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, A Modest Proposal for Improving American Justice, 99 COLUM. L. 
REV. 215, 229 (1999).  Although they may have intended to articulate a theory of com-
pliance with doctrine, Cross and Tiller’s starting assumption appeared to be that judges 
are prone to disobey the law.  Other readers have understood their argument in simi-
lar terms.  See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, Essay, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. 
Circuit, 84 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1337, 1367 (1998) (describing Cross and Tiller’s argument 
as “sheer speculation” based on the assumption “that judicial decision making has 
nothing to do with principle or internal coherence”); Patricia M. Wald, A Response to 
Tiller and Cross, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 235, 244 (1999) (characterizing Tiller and Cross’s  
argument as one that describes judges as “launch[ing] into a jurisprudential free-for-
all”). 
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Linkous and Tiller defend the whistleblower terminology on the 
grounds that “[d]isobedience in the sense used in WT is merely a de-
scriptor used to denote the non-neutral application of doctrine.”19
“Disobedience” does not apply to discretionary decisions.  It makes 
no sense, for example, for me to tell my child that she can decide 
what time to go to bed, and then accuse her of disobedience when she 
stays up until midnight.  Similarly, when legal doctrine affords lower 
court judges discretionary space when applying the law, it is inapt to 
describe their decisions in that space as “disobedient” merely because 
they tend in a particular direction.
  If 
by “non-neutral” they mean that judges are sometimes observed to dif-
fer systematically in the results they arrive at, I would have no quarrel 
with a theory resting on that observation.  But I believe that language 
matters, and “disobedience” suggests something more than “non-
neutral decisionmaking.”  “Disobedience” connotes a person acting in 
deliberate disregard of an instruction she is obliged (legally, morally, 
or otherwise) to obey, or at the very least, acting contrary to a clear 
mandate, even if she did not understand the mandate or the fact that 
her actions violate it. 
20  If “whistleblowing” simply means 
checking the tendency for judges to use their discretionary authority 
in a non-neutral manner, then using the terms “disobedience” and 
“whistleblowing” is misleading given the conventional understanding 
of those words.21
Putting aside this disagreement about terminology, many of Link-
ous and Tiller’s criticisms of my Article are beside the point because 
they misunderstand what it is about.  Most importantly, my empirical 
study is not a test of Cross and Tiller’s whistleblower theory.  Their 
theory addresses the question of when appellate judges obey doc-
 
 
19
Linkous & Tiller, supra note 10, at 89. 
20
Kim, supra note 17, at 409-10, 417. 
21
Linkous and Tiller argue that applying whistleblowing terminology to judges is 
“no worse” than describing many decisions in noncriminal contexts as “prisoner’s di-
lemmas.”  Linkous & Tiller, supra note 10, at 90.  There is a difference, however.  De-
scribing two firms in an oligopoly as facing a “prisoner’s dilemma” in their production 
decisions invokes a metaphor—a figure of speech applied to something not literally 
applicable to suggest some important similarity.  The choice facing the firm deciding 
whether or not to restrict output might share some structural characteristics with the 
prisoner deciding whether or not to cooperate, but no one could possibly mistake the 
firm for an individual criminal defendant.  Judges, however, can disobey the law and 
disregard doctrine, and it is confusing, if not misleading, to say that they are “disobey-
ing” the law if what one really means is that they are exercising their discretion in a 
“non-neutral” manner. 
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trine.22  By contrast, my study starts with a different question:  what 
explains panel effects?  More specifically, does a strategic explanation 
best explain why appellate judges appear to be influenced by the pre-
ferences of their copanelists when deciding cases?23  Cross and Tiller’s 
theory does not offer a clear answer to that question.  Their “central 
thesis” is that “legal doctrine’s interaction with panel diversity . . . pro-
duces ‘panel effects.’”24  But what exactly is the nature of that interac-
tion?  Cross and Tiller propose two possible explanations.  First, a 
“minority member may threaten to highlight . . . disobedience exter-
nally to a higher court or to Congress, producing exposure and possi-
ble reversal.”25  Rather than run that risk, the majority might choose to 
“obey” legal doctrine.  A second possibility is that “the minority may 
expose the subconscious disobedience internally, causing the majority 
to acknowledge its disregard or unintentional manipulation of doc-
trine,” leading the majority to “capitulate and keep its decision within 
the confines of doctrine.”26  These two explanations correspond 
roughly (although not precisely) to the distinction I draw between 
strategic and deliberative accounts.27  However, Cross and Tiller’s em-
pirical study cannot distinguish between these explanations.  Their re-
sults show that mixed panels are more likely to defer to agency deci-
sions that run counter to their political preferences,28 but this pattern 
is consistent with both explanations.  In fact, their whistleblower 
theory encompasses both:  “WT addresses both strategic and delibera-
tive models of panel effects and does not give preference to one of 
these mechanisms over the other as both may be at work.”29
In Deliberation and Strategy my purpose was to examine when panel 
effects occur in an effort to tease apart two possible explanations—
one focusing on deliberative processes internal to a panel; the other 
positing strategic interactions among appellate judges in light of the 
anticipated response of a reviewing court.
 
30
 
22
See Cross & Tiller, supra note 
  Thus, my study was not 
designed to confirm or disconfirm Cross and Tiller’s original theory; 
9, at 2158 (describing the inquiry as one determin-
ing “under what conditions appellate court judges do obey . . . doctrine[]”). 
23
Kim, supra note 1, at 1339. 
24
Linkous & Tiller, supra note 10, at 84. 
25
Cross & Tiller, supra note 9, at 2159. 
26
Id.  
27
See Kim, supra note 1, at 1333-37 (differentiating “strategic” from “deliberative” 
effects as involving interactions with actors outside the panel). 
28
Cross & Tiller, supra note 9, at 2172. 
29
Linkous & Tiller, supra note 10, at 86. 
30
See generally Kim, supra note 1. 
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rather it used the phenomenon they had documented as a starting 
point for further inquiry.  The empirical test I undertook—
determining whether or not alignment between the minority judge on 
a mixed panel and a reviewing court affected whether we observe 
panel effects—was intended to distinguish strategic from nonstrategic 
accounts of panel effects.31  What I found was that the relationship be-
tween the preferences of the panel members and the preferences of 
the circuit as a whole affected the degree to which we observed panel 
effects, while the relationship to the preferences of the Supreme 
Court did not.32
Are my empirical results “consistent with WT”
 
33 as Linkous and 
Tiller claim?  Because Cross and Tiller’s theory encompasses both stra-
tegic and nonstrategic explanations,34
Are my empirical results consistent with each component of their 
whistleblowing theory?  Not quite.  The results are consistent with a 
strategic model of panel decisionmaking vis-à-vis the circuit as a whole 
but not vis-à-vis the Supreme Court.  Thus, to the extent that Cross 
and Tiller’s theory suggests that majority judges may be more likely to 
bend to the wishes of the minority because of a threat of review and 
reversal by the circuit en banc, my findings support that explanation.
 any outcome of my empirical 
test would be consistent with their theory.  The obviousness of this re-
sult simply highlights the fact that my study was not intended to test 
Cross and Tiller’s whistleblower theory. 
35  
My results, however, are inconsistent with Cross and Tiller’s whistleb-
lowing theory “to the extent that it posits that the presence of a minority 
judge who will ‘blow the whistle’ induces the panel majority to obey 
Supreme Court doctrine.”36
 
31
See id. at 1342-47. 
  To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that 
32
Id. at 1367-68 (explaining that the empirical test “offer[ed] no evidence that 
panel effects are sensitive to the preferences of the Supreme Court” but did “provide[] 
strong evidence that the preferences of the full circuit influence panel effects”). 
33
Linkous & Tiller, supra note 10, at 84, 90. 
34
See id. at 86 (“WT addresses both strategic and deliberative models of panel ef-
fects and does not give preference to one of these mechanisms over the other as both 
may be at work.”). 
35
Linkous and Tiller erroneously assert that I “mischaracteriz[e] the strategic 
prong of WT as being strictly a circuit panel-Supreme Court model rather than a cir-
cuit panel-higher court model.”  Id. at 87.  In fact, I describe Cross and Tiller’s theory 
as one in which “appellate judges use dissents as a signal to the Supreme Court or the 
circuit en banc.”  Kim, supra note 1, at 1335 (emphasis added). 
36
Kim, supra note 1, at 1367 (emphasis added) (citing Cross & Tiller, supra note 9, 
at 2159).  Contrary to Linkous and Tiller’s assertion, I did not claim that my results are 
inconsistent with Cross and Tiller’s original theory (full stop).  Rather, I wrote that 
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lower courts do not obey Supreme Court doctrine.  I assume they 
generally do.  But my results do not support the theory that they are 
more likely to do so because a minority panel member can raise the risk 
of dissent and reversal.  Thus, although my empirical study was not 
designed to test Cross and Tiller’s original theory, its results provide 
some additional evidence as to which of their hypothesized explana-
tions is more likely to be true. 
Linkous and Tiller also level a methodological criticism against my 
study—that it fails to code for legal doctrine.37  I am already on record 
asserting my belief in the importance of legal doctrine in judicial deci-
sionmaking—particularly for lower court judges38—so I will not repeat 
those claims here.  Their criticism, however, again stems from a mi-
sunderstanding about the focus of my project.  My purpose was not to 
test for the role of legal doctrine.  I assume that legal doctrine always 
plays a role in appellate court decisionmaking.  Rather, I am interest-
ed in those areas in which doctrine does not dictate a given outcome, 
where appellate judges are free to exercise some discretion in decid-
ing a case.  It is in those areas that we are likely to see a divergence in 
outcomes between judges with different outlooks or policy prefe-
rences, and therefore where panel effects are most likely to operate.  
On the other hand, if doctrine clearly dictates a particular outcome, 
we are unlikely to observe either voting patterns divided along ideo-
logical lines or panel effects.  Because my purpose was not to test the 
influence of doctrine, coding for doctrine was unnecessary.  Rather, I 
was interested in exploring when and why panel effects occur in the 
discretionary spaces, and therefore my study measured changes in 
counter-ideological voting—that is, changes in the extent to which a 
judge appears to be modifying her behavior in response to other ac-
tors within the judicial system.39
In any case, even Cross and Tiller’s original empirical study does 
not code doctrine directly.  Linkous and Tiller defend the original 
method as follows:  they acknowledge that the Chevron doctrine will 
not dictate a clearly correct outcome in every case and that “disobe-
 
 
they were inconsistent to the extent that their theory posited a whistleblower effect vis-
à-vis the Supreme Court. 
37
Linkous & Tiller, supra note 10, at 90-91. 
38
See, e.g., Kim, supra note 1, at 1342, 1368 (pointing out that judges are influ-
enced and constrained by legal doctrine); Kim, supra note 17, at 417 (arguing that 
judges have legal as well as policy preferences and that those legal preferences likely 
lead them to comply with superior court precedent). 
39
Kim, supra note 1, at 1346-47. 
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dience” cannot be easily identified in a given case.40  However, they 
argue that the “uneven application of the Chevron doctrine over a ‘pat-
tern of cases’” allows Cross and Tiller to identify disobedience to doc-
trine.41  But this conclusion does not follow.  If the doctrine does not 
always mandate a single correct outcome, then a pattern of differen-
tial results does not necessarily mean that doctrine has been dis-
obeyed.  It could be that in all cases in which the application of the 
doctrine is clear, the judges have reached the correct answer (or more 
likely, the litigants have settled or never brought the case in the first 
place), while in those case in which the application of the doctrine is 
uncertain, the judges exercise discretion—legitimately so—but are in-
evitably influenced by their beliefs, values, and so on.  Thus, the ob-
servation that different judges (or different types of judges) have dif-
ferent patterns of deciding cases is consistent with obedience to 
doctrine, given that doctrine does not always dictate a clear outcome.42  I 
do not quibble with Cross and Tiller’s method of aggregating outcomes 
across cases, nor do I deny that they found something important when 
they did so.  However, because their methodology measures differences 
in outcomes under different circumstances,43
My methodology departs from Cross and Tiller’s in another way—
this one more substantive.  According to Linkous and Tiller, the 
alignment between the panel members and a higher court “is not es-
sential to the strategic prong of WT.”
 but not disobedience to the 
law in particular cases, it does not capture doctrine either. 
44  In their view, all that is re-
quired is that the reviewing court “be compelled (either politically or 
through its proper judicial role) to enforce doctrine on review of the 
panel decision.”45
 
40
Linkous & Tiller, supra note 
  In contrast, I believe that the alignment between 
the preferences of the panel members and the higher court is crucial 
to strategic accounts of panel effects.  It is possible that the reviewing 
court—the Supreme Court or the circuit en banc—might feel com-
pelled to enforce doctrine with which it disagrees, but given that each 
of these courts has the power to review, modify, and even reverse its 
10, at 88. 
41
Id. at 89; see also Cross & Tiller, supra note 9, at 2165 (“By looking at a pattern of 
cases, we strive to test for disobedience.”).  
42
See Kim, supra note 17, at 408-17. 
43
Understood in this way, their empirical method and mine are quite similar.  
Over a large number of cases, we observe a differential pattern of votes between judges 
with different political or ideological orientations.  We each try to exploit variations in 
those patterns of votes in order to isolate and test particular theories of judicial deci-
sionmaking. 
44
Linkous & Tiller, supra note 10, at 84. 
45
Id. at 88. 
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own prior precedents, that seems unlikely.46  Even if those courts feel 
compelled “politically or through [their] proper judicial role” not to 
reverse a prior precedent,47
Often, however, the preferences of the higher court will also be 
reflected in the doctrine they articulate, and this creates the behavioral-
equivalence problem emphasized by Lindquist and Martinek in their 
response.
 the discretionary nature of en banc re-
hearings and Supreme Court appeals means that they can avoid en-
forcing a doctrine with which they no longer agree simply by declin-
ing review.  Thus, if appellate judges did behave strategically, they 
would try to anticipate the responses of a higher court by focusing on 
the preferences of that court, not just doctrine. 
48  The measure that I use for the circuit court’s policy prefe-
rences—the ideal point of the median judge on the circuit—likely also 
correlates with the location of doctrine in that circuit.  Thus, the ob-
servation that the minority judge on a panel is more likely to influence 
the majority judges when the minority judge is aligned with circuit 
preferences is consistent with both a strategic account—the majority 
judges fear reversal by the circuit en banc—and an explanation that 
points to the persuasive power of doctrine.49  To that extent, Lindquist 
and Martinek are correct that the results of my study are “consonant 
with at least some versions of a deliberative account.”50
However, although my study cannot definitively distinguish be-
tween strategic and deliberative explanations of panel effects, not all 
versions of these theories are supported by the evidence.  A delibera-
tive account that focuses on the role of circuit doctrine in panel deci-
sionmaking is consistent with my results; a purely psychological model 
is not.  So, for example, theories that minority judges change their 
votes because they feel pressure to conform to the views of the majori-
 
 
46
Cross and Tiller’s starting assumption is that appellate judges sitting on a panel 
are more likely to follow legal doctrine which supports their policy preferences.  See 
Cross & Tiller, supra note 9, at 2159 (“Judges are more likely to obey legal doctrine 
when such doctrine supports the partisan or ideological policy preferences of the court 
majority.”).  It is entirely consistent with that assumption to posit that appellate judges 
sitting en banc and Supreme Court Justices, who face even fewer constraints on their 
decisionmaking, are also more likely to enforce legal doctrine that comports with their 
policy preferences. 
47
Linkous & Tiller, supra note 10, at 88. 
48
Lindquist & Martinek, supra note 10, at 77-78. 
49
See Kim, supra note 1, at 1374 (“[I]t may be the case that a minority judge will be 
most successful in convincing the panel majority to change its views when her own 
views are more closely aligned with the circuit’s than with the majority’s.”). 
50
Lindquist & Martinek, supra note 10, at 77. 
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ty or that unified panels “go to extremes”51
At the same time, my study does not support the theory that panel 
effects occur because appellate judges act strategically with an eye to-
ward Supreme Court review and reversal.  Lindquist and Martinek say 
they are not surprised by this finding, citing an earlier study by David 
Klein and Robert Hume that found no evidence that fear of reversal 
influenced circuit judges’ decisionmaking.
 are inconsistent with my 
finding that a judge’s willingness to go along with her colleagues de-
pends upon whether the minority judge is aligned with the circuit as a 
whole or not.  Purely psychological, group-dynamic effects such as 
conformity pressures and group polarization should not vary depend-
ing upon the views of the circuit as a whole. 
52  There is other support as 
well, including Lindquist’s and Martinek’s own work, which found no 
evidence that court of appeals judges dissent strategically in order to 
provoke Supreme Court review.53  This accumulating evidence is im-
portant, because it casts doubt on the hypothesis commonly advanced 
in the judicial politics literature that lower court judges follow Su-
preme Court precedent because they fear reversal.54
 
51
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DAVID SCHKADE, LISA M. ELLMAN & ANDRES SAWICKI, ARE 
JUDGES POLITICAL?  AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 71 (2006) (em-
phasis omitted); see also id. at 67-78 (arguing that panel effects result from “conformity 
effects” (the tendency to yield when confronted with unanimous opinions of others) 
and “group polarization” (the phenomenon that “[d]eliberating groups of like-
minded people tend to go to extremes”) (emphasis omitted)). 
 
52
See David E. Klein & Robert J. Hume, Fear of Reversal as an Explanation of Lower 
Court Compliance, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 579, 597 (2003) (finding results “directly con-
trary to what [they] should have found if fear of reversal were the prime driving force 
behind circuit judges’ decisions”). 
53
See VIRGINIA A. HETTINGER, STEFANIE A. LINDQUIST & WENDY L. MARTINEK, 
JUDGING ON A COLLEGIAL COURT 81-86 (2006); see also Donald R. Songer, Martha 
Humphries Ginn & Tammy A. Sarver, Do Judges Follow the Law When There Is No Fear of 
Reversal?, 24 JUST. SYS. J. 137, 139, 154-55 (2003) (examining circuit court decisionmak-
ing in tort diversity cases, where there is no “realistic fear of review,” and finding that the 
decisions appropriately follow the relevant state law rather than policy preferences). 
54
See, e.g., Charles M. Cameron, Jeffrey A. Segal & Donald Songer, Strategic Audit-
ing in a Political Hierarchy:  An Informational Model of the Supreme Court’s Certiorari Deci-
sions, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 101, 102 (2000) (suggesting that reversal operates as a 
sanction upon lower courts and that “‘[j]udicial culture’ famously includes a desire to 
avoid reversals”); Tracey E. George & Albert H. Yoon, The Federal Court System:  A Prin-
cipal-Agent Perspective, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 819, 22 (2003) (arguing that the Supreme 
Court’s “obvious mechanism of control over lower court judges is reversal of their deci-
sions”); Donald R. Songer, Jeffrey A. Segal & Charles M. Cameron, The Hierarchy of Jus-
tice:  Testing a Principal-Agent Model of Supreme Court-Circuit Court Interactions, 38 AM. J. 
POL. SCI. 673, 693 (1994) (theorizing that Supreme Court monitoring of lower court 
decisions is effective because appeals courts anticipate that noncompliant decisions are 
likely to be appealed and reversed). 
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Lindquist and Martinek raise a methodological point as well.  
They note the “limitations of the inferences that can be drawn from a 
study such as Professor Kim’s,” which is based exclusively on cases in a 
particular subject matter area.55  They are right, of course, and I do 
not claim that my findings can be generalized to judicial decisionmak-
ing by all types of collegial courts in all types of cases.  On the other 
hand, studies which aggregate across many issue areas, as their earlier 
work does,56 also have limitations.  While such studies can tell us 
whether a particular effect is observed systematically across all case 
types, they may also mask important phenomena that operate only in 
a subset of cases or under certain conditions.  Thus, as I speculated 
earlier, the choices of Cross and Tiller and Steven Van Winkle to focus 
on cases in selected issue areas may explain why they found evidence 
of strategic behavior on the courts of appeals, while Hettinger, Lin-
quist, and Martinek, who drew a sample from all court of appeals cases 
across issue areas, did not.57
At this point, it is useful to juxtapose the methodological points 
raised in both responses to my Article.  Lindquist and Martinek sug-
gest that my results cannot be generalized because they are based on a 
limited sample of cases.  Linkous and Tiller argue that I should have 
coded for legal doctrine.  These two critiques push in opposite direc-
tions.  Expanding the number of issue areas included in a study makes 
controlling for doctrine—already a daunting task—truly impossible.  
On the other hand, really coding for doctrine requires narrowing the 
sample of studied cases to those that entail application of a single rule 
or doctrinal framework.  It is no accident that studies that have most 
successfully captured the role of doctrine are limited to a single sub-
ject matter area.
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Ultimately, I think that both Lindquist and Martinek and Linkous 
and Tiller are right.  We need more large-scale, quantitative studies 
that cut across issue areas, and we need more studies that hone in on 
a particular doctrinal area in order to better understand panel effects 
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See generally HETTINGER, LINDQUIST & MARTINEK, supra note 53. 
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Kim, supra note 1, at 1339-40. 
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See, e.g., Herbert M. Kritzer & Mark J. Richards, Research Note, Jurisprudential 
Regimes and Supreme Court Decisionmaking:  The Lemon Regime and Establishment Clause 
Cases, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 827, 838-39 (2003) (testing theory that jurisprudential re-
gimes structure Court decision-making by examining Establishment Clause cases); Jeff-
rey A. Segal, Predicting Supreme Court Cases Probabilistically:  The Search and Seizure Cases, 
1962–1981, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 891 (1984) (testing a model that uses legal variables 
to predict outcomes in search and seizure cases). 
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as well as other aspects of judicial decisionmaking.  Each of these dif-
ferent methods will reveal different aspects of the phenomenon under 
study.  None alone can provide a complete picture of how judges de-
cide.  And, of course, each approach requires caution in interpreting 
its results and discerning its implications.  Judicial decisionmaking is a 
complex phenomenon, and our understanding of it will advance 
more quickly if we are flexible and broad-minded in our methodolog-
ical approaches, rather than insisting on adherence to existing models 
or a particular methodology. 
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